The history of AIDS exceptionalism by Julia H Smith & Alan Whiteside
DEBATE Open Access
The history of AIDS exceptionalism
Julia H Smith1,2*†, Alan Whiteside1†
Abstract
In the history of public health, HIV/AIDS is unique; it has widespread and long-lasting demographic, social, eco-
nomic and political impacts. The global response has been unprecedented. AIDS exceptionalism - the idea that the
disease requires a response above and beyond “normal” health interventions - began as a Western response to the
originally terrifying and lethal nature of the virus. More recently, AIDS exceptionalism came to refer to the disease-
specific global response and the resources dedicated to addressing the epidemic. There has been a backlash
against this exceptionalism, with critics claiming that HIV/AIDS receives a disproportionate amount of international
aid and health funding.
This paper situations this debate in historical perspective. By reviewing histories of the disease, policy develop-
ments and funding patterns, it charts how the meaning of AIDS exceptionalism has shifted over three decades. It
argues that while the connotation of the term has changed, the epidemic has maintained its course, and therefore
some of the justifications for exceptionalism remain.
Background
In the 30 years since it was first recognized, HIV has
spread globally. An estimated 25 million people have
died, and about 33 million people are currently living
with HIV/AIDS. The epidemic is not homogenous; the
global picture is diverse. In wealthy countries, most of
Latin America, Asia, north Africa and the Middle East,
infections are concentrated in particular geographical
locations and among specific population groups. These
are often socially and politically marginalized popula-
tions, including injecting drug users, men who have sex
with men, and commercial sex workers.
Generalized epidemics are found in eastern, central
and southern Africa, where between 5% and 30% of
adults are infected. However, even here, specific groups,
such as women, remain disproportionately at risk. The
development of HIV “risk environments” [1] has been
shaped by social-structural, economic and political fac-
tors specific to each context, and indicated by differing
prevalence rates.
In the history of public health, HIV/AIDS is unique in
terms of how it is spread and attacks the body and
because of its widespread and long-lasting demographic,
social, economic and political impacts. HIV/AIDS is a
long-wave event: an epidemic that, where it is most pre-
valent, will have consequences that will be felt for gen-
erations [2]. Just as the epidemic is distinctive, so has
been the response, though for opposite reasons. Despite
the progression of the epidemic, the HIV/AIDS response
has been characterized by both lack of action and fev-
ered aid at different points in time. This disease-specific
response has become known as AIDS exceptionalism.
The word, “exceptionalism”, means to treat or to give
something the status of being exceptional, and can be
positive or negative.
AIDS exceptionalism began as a Western response to
the originally terrifying and lethal nature of the virus,
which disproportionately affected specific groups. The
first activists argued that HIV/AIDS required an excep-
tional response in order to protect the rights of those
infected, to generate resources to assist them and to
curb a then mysterious epidemic. More recently, AIDS
exceptionalism came to refer to the disease-specific glo-
bal response. This international response was unprece-
dented, as the commitment of resources exceeded any
other health cause.
International organizations, such as the Joint United
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the Glo-
bal Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the
Global Fund) and the US President’s Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), were formed to specifically
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address HIV/AIDS. In the past few years, there has been
a backlash against this exceptionalism, with critics
claiming that HIV/AIDS receives a disproportionate
amount of international aid and health funding, and that
this has implications for other health issues.
This paper reviews the histories of the disease, policy
developments and funding patterns to chart how the
meaning of AIDS exceptionalism has shifted over three
decades. It argues that, while the connotation of the
term has changed, the epidemic has maintained its
course, and therefore some of the justifications for
exceptionalism remain.
Discussion
The rise of exceptionalism in the West
In the early 1980s, when previously healthy, mostly
homosexual young men began dying, the unknown
cause and rising numbers of deaths combined with
homophobia to generate a response of blame and fear.
Extreme religious right-wing advocates spoke of divine
punishment for “sinful” lifestyles [3]. The disease was
initially termed the gay-related immunodeficiency dis-
ease (GRID), or “the gay plague” [4]. Homosexual men
were openly discriminated against when they tried to
access health services.
As haemophiliacs, women and children in the West
increasingly presented with the same symptoms, it
became clear that the cause of illness was not related to
sexual orientation. In 1983, the human immunodefi-
ciency virus (HIV) was identified as the cause of AIDS.
The realization that HIV could spread to the general
public, and that it was linked to the life-giving and plea-
surable acts of sexual intercourse, resulted in increased
hysteria. Governments, the media and scientists sought
a quick response: “A sense of urgency defined the pro-
blem, and the public information materials developed in
this period often emphasized danger at the expense of
clear information about prevention measures” [5]. Even
as information about modes of transmission (unpro-
tected sexual intercourse, injecting drug use, and from
mother to infant) became more accurate, the original
fear and stigma prevailed.
The gay rights movement, building on the momentum
it had gained in the preceding decades, began campaign-
ing for HIV/AIDS to be viewed as a human rights issue.
Advocates argued that infection was not the only risk; if
found positive, individuals also faced harmful discrimi-
nation [6]. In this, they were supported by public health
officials, who feared that stigma would prevent those at
risk from getting tested, and those infected from acces-
sing health services:
Avoiding compulsory measures such as isolation and
quarantine, which were so much a part of the public
health tradition, was all the more crucial, since the
people with increased risk – gay and bisexual men,
drug users, and their sexual partners – were already
socially vulnerable ... Policies and practices that
appeared to threaten such persons could only drive the
epidemic underground and make it more difficult to
work with the populations within which HIV was
spreading [7].
Recognizing the unique needs of populations at risk of
HIV infection, an exceptionalist alliance, including the
gay community, liberal and left-wing parties, and the
healthcare and psychosocial professions, was formed to
advocate for a unique response. Bayer writes, “The
embrace of exceptionalism must be understood in broad
political terms, as representing in large measure, a singu-
lar victory on the part of gay men, their community-
based organisations and their allies” [8]. The alliance pro-
moted the empowerment of those groups most at risk,
and the assurance that their rights would be protected.
During the 1980s, public health adopted a human
rights framework that took societal-based vulnerability
into consideration and increasingly became involved in
societal transformation efforts [5]. HIV/AIDS was posi-
tioned as not only a health condition, but also as a
social issue that required a political, as well as a medical,
response [4]. The scientific establishment’s control on
public health was challenged, and a new type of public
health initiative was called for: one that provided coun-
selling, protected privacy, and empowered the patient.
Lazzarini summarizes:
Descriptively, exceptionalism posited that in the
early years of the HIV epidemic, HIV was considered
so different, so “exceptional” in comparison to other
communicable diseases that advocates and public
health officials agreed that HIV policy should cater
to the uniqueness of the epidemic rather than treat
it like all other communicable diseases. Supposedly,
the argument goes, public fear was so great, the poli-
tical power of gay men so substantial, and concern
over stigmatization so real, that public health autho-
rities abandoned “traditional” approaches to commu-
nicable disease control in favor of a civil liberties
approach [9].
This public health approach helped contain the epi-
demic among those groups most at risk, and meet, to
varying degrees, their specific needs. New infections in
the United States fell from approximately 130,000 in
1984 to about 60,000 in 1991 [10]. The feared general
epidemic never occurred in the West.
The hysteria surrounding HIV/AIDS faded; the media
and public policy lost interest. The human rights
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approach that had previously been revolutionary was
integrated into existing public health traditions that
included education, technical solutions and regular test-
ing. In 1991, Bayer wrote, “As AIDS has become less
threatening, the claims of those who argued that the
exceptional threat would require exceptional policies
have begun to lose their force” [11]. Highly affected
communities continued to advocate for the rights of
people living with HIV and AIDS (PLHIV) and against
stigma, but much of the sense of urgency among the
general public was lost.
When antiretroviral treatment (ART) was unveiled at
the 1996 International AIDS Conference in Vancouver,
Canada, AIDS was transformed into a treatable disease.
The advent of treatment shifted Western priorities of
response: “The availability of more advanced antiretro-
viral therapies has made it possible to treat effectively
those with HIV infection, thereby increasing the impor-
tance of early identification and tracking. These develop-
ments establish a strong case for moving beyond HIV
exceptionalism and treating HIV antibody tests like
other blood tests” [12].
As technical solutions of testing and treatment gained
priority, the social movement that had spurred the early
HIV/AIDS response continued to fade from public
awareness. This shift was assisted by a rapid fall in the
price of the drugs. Had they remained expensive, AIDS
exceptionalism would have been perpetuated. As Casar-
att and Lantos noted, “Medical therapy has become
more effective but also prohibitively expensive. A medi-
cal tragedy has been transformed into a financial crisis
and society has responded by establishing special pro-
grams and sources of funding for AIDS. These man-
oeuvres parallel earlier approaches to HIV testing and
reporting that have collectively come to be known as
exceptionalism” [13]. The mobilization of resources to
make treatment available in the West altered HIV/AIDS
from a lethal disease to a manageable chronic illness. By
2000, AIDS exceptionalism, as it had originally been
conceived, was over.
Throughout the rise and fall of Western AIDS excep-
tionalism, the growing global epidemic remained largely
ignored by the international community [14]. During
the 1980s, reports from Africa of similar diseases and
symptoms were ignored [15]. There were few attempts,
and even resistance, to linking HIV/AIDS to “slim dis-
ease”, as it was called in central Africa [14]. When the
African AIDS epidemic was finally recognized, in the
late 1980s, little international attention or resources
were forthcoming. In 1990 and 1991, only 6% of the
total global spending for HIV prevention went to the
developing world [16]. For international organizations,
after the first fears of a Western rampant unstoppable
epidemic were allayed, HIV/AIDS was not a priority.
The Global Programme on AIDS in the World Health
Organization (WHO) lacked both the funding and capa-
city to respond to the epidemic. Outside of WHO, HIV/
AIDS was not on the agenda of other United Nations
(UN) agencies. International responses between 1986
and 1996 were characterized by denial, underestimation
and over-simplification [17]. AIDS exceptionalism was
originally a Western-focused phenomenon that advo-
cated for the rights of those most affected and became a
decreasing public force as effective treatment was rolled
out in North America and Europe.
International exceptionalism
In 1996, UNAIDS was formed as a joint programme of
UN agencies engaged in the AIDS response [17]. In
1998, it published its first set of comprehensive data on
HIV/AIDS, demonstrating the global scale of the epi-
demic, and increasing awareness about the generalized
epidemic in parts of sub-Saharan Africa. Such data pro-
vided an information arsenal for those advocating for
increased resources for HIV/AIDS in mid- and high-pre-
valence developing countries [17]. UNAIDS, adopting
public health rhetoric from the early AIDS response in
the West, stressed the need for comprehensive
responses that reached beyond a medical approach, and
began advocating for increased funding for AIDS pro-
grammes [18]. During the same period, donor countries
began to scale up international aid contributions. Gen-
eral overseas development assistance increased from US
$53.6 billion in 2000 to US$61.1 billion in 2003 [19].
This aid was targeted towards issues perceived as “glo-
bal”, such as poverty, debt relief and communicable
diseases.
HIV/AIDS gained prominence among these issues
through the language of securitization and globalization.
In 2000, US Vice President Al Gore said, “It [HIV]
threatens not just individual citizens, but the very
institutions that define and defend the character of a
society ... It strikes at the military, and subverts the
forces of order and peacekeeping” [20]. The US National
Intelligence Council then produced The Global Infec-
tious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United
States [21]. Six months later, the UN Security Council
passed Resolution 1308, stating, “The HIV/AIDS pan-
demic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and
security” [22]. In 2001, UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan called for a “war chest” of $7-10 billion to
address the global HIV/AIDS crisis [23].
The Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies
wrote, “The severe social and economic impact of HIV/
AIDS, and the infiltration of the epidemic into the rul-
ing political and military elites and middle classes of
developing countries may intensify the struggle for poli-
tical power to control scarce state resources. Such
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dynamics, even singularly, have the potential to lead to
political instability” [24].
It was argued that HIV/AIDS could hinder processes
of democratization by undermining social development
and intensifying the struggle for resources. It was further
suggested that AIDS orphans could contribute to social
unrest as they made likely recruits for terror and rebel
groups: “Bluntly put, those who are orphaned may be
indifferent to prevailing norms and values, may look for
salvation to millenarian and fundamentalist beliefs of
one kind or another, and may ultimately do this with
assistance from a Kalashnikov or a bomb” [2].
While there was little evidence to actually link HIV/
AIDS prevalence and security issues [25], the discourse
of global threats drew international attention to the epi-
demic. Barnett and Prins write, “The combination of
AIDS, orphans and terror begins to take on an indepen-
dent life, perhaps regardless of either the strength of the
evidence or the precise value of the parallel” [25]. HIV
was seen as a virus that could have widespread reper-
cussions for the most affluent and powerful, even
though risk of infection and disease spread in these
populations had abated. The epidemic was positioned as
a homogenous issue with impacts for both the devel-
oped and developing world.
However, as policy and activists spoke of a global
HIV/AIDS epidemic, it became apparent that, like many
diseases that are expensive to treat, how this epidemic
was experienced differed drastically by region. ART,
available from 1996, proved effective in curbing AIDS
deaths in those regions that could afford the high costs
of medications (originally more than $25,000 per patient
per year). In those countries with mid to high HIV/
AIDS prevalence, ART remained unaffordable, even
while costs dropped to about $10,000 per patient per
year by 2000 and to less than $100 by 2010. A mid to
high disease burden combined with lack of health
resources in much of the developing world, making the
benefits of ART beyond the reach of most domestic
health budgets. While AIDS had become a chronic dis-
ease in the West, in most of the developing world. it
was still a death sentence.
What made this discrepancy unique was the interna-
tional mobilization that occurred around it, positioning
the inequity of treatment access for people living with
HIV and AIDS (PLHIV) as an international human
rights cause. The International AIDS Conference in
Durban in 2000 called for treatment to be rolled out in
the developing world and for prices of ART be cut.
Activists in South Africa demanded that their govern-
ment provide universal access to ART, despite political
resistance and denial. The governments of India and
Brazil took on the World Trade Organization, arguing
for compulsory licensing that would enable them to
manufacture cheaper generic medications. Activists in
the United States, largely led by the PLHIV organization,
ActUp, began a sustained campaign against the US gov-
ernment’s support for pharmaceutical companies’ patent
legislation [26].
Arguments that ART could not be provided in the
developing world due to limited capacity and poverty
were challenged by the successful implementation of
such programmes by health organizations like Médecins
Sans Frontières [27]. Researchers found that people liv-
ing in poverty adhered to medication regimes just as
consistently, if not more so, as those living in the devel-
oped world. Economists argued that the benefits of ART
(keeping populations healthy for longer) outweighed the
costs of treatment [28], adding further fuel to the
human rights argument.
In 2002, Botswana implemented the first universal
access programmes in sub-Sahara Africa. In 2003, the
South African Government gave in to local and interna-
tional pressure and announced its public treatment pro-
gramme. The World Health Organization launched the
“3 × 5” campaign, aiming to place 3 million people on
treatment by 2005. In 2006, 111 countries committed to
achieving universal access to prevention, treatment, care
and support by 2010 [29].
The development of international AIDS programmes
combined with a favourable political environment to cre-
ate a new discourse of AIDS exceptionalism. At the 2001
UN General Assembly Special Session on AIDS, 189
nations agreed that HIV/AIDS was a national and inter-
national development issue of the highest priority [30].
This translated into increased international funding for
HIV/AIDS programmes. In 2002, the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria was established. In
2003, US President George W Bush pledged $15 billion
toward PEPFAR. In 2004, Kofi Annan prioritized HIV/
AIDS, stating, “AIDS is a new type of global emergency–
an unprecedented threat to human development” [30].
In 2004, at the Copenhagen Consensus, a policy think
tank in Denmark, a panel of eight prominent economists
ranked controlling HIV/AIDS as the number one eco-
nomic priority in terms of a cost-benefit analysis in
health and nutrition [14]. UNAIDS Executive Director
Peter Poit encapsulated the exceptionalist point of view,
saying, “This pandemic is exceptional because there is
no plateau in sight, exceptional because of the severity
and longevity of its impact, and exceptional because of
the special challenges it poses to effective public action”
[31]. The world had realized the size and impact of the
AIDS epidemic, and was treating it as an emergency.
The end of AIDS exceptionalism?
Arguments against exceptionalism began to gain atten-
tion in 2007. The amount of funding allocated to HIV/
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AIDS was called into question, as were the types of
programmes being implemented. Three important books
put forward new arguments. Chin and Pisani focused on
the Asian experience, suggesting that scientists,
UNAIDS and AIDS activists accept certain myths about
HIV epidemiology to maintain the political profile of
AIDS, and their own jobs [32]. Pisani spoke of resources
for HIV/AIDS programmes disappearing down an “ideo-
logical drain” [33]. They suggested the epidemic was
overstated, and money and resources were being
deployed in situations where HIV would not spread any-
way. Epstein’s The Invisible Cure focused on the African
epidemic, suggesting that one of the main drivers of the
epidemic in hyper-epidemic countries was concurrent
sexual partnering, but that such sensitive social issues
had not been openly or adequately addressed, despite
the resources mobilized for curbing the epidemic [34].
The strongest argument against AIDS exceptionalism
has centred on the claim that responses undermined
health systems in developing countries. In a series of
opinion pieces in the British Medical Journal, Roger
England argued that HIV/AIDS was not the “global cat-
astrophe” claimed by “AIDS exceptionalists”, and that
donor aid for HIV/AIDS was disproportionate to the
contribution of HIV/AIDS to the global disease burden
[35]. England asserted that it would have been more
cost effective to put the money into bed nets, immuni-
zation and dealing with childhood diseases. He accused
UNAIDS of creating “the biggest vertical programme in
history”, which diverted human resources from the pub-
lic sector, created additional reporting requirements and
poorly coordinated donor activities for governments to
cope with, and removed national control over spending
priorities [36]. He wrote:
It is no longer heresy to point out that far too much
is spent on HIV relative to other needs and that this
is damaging health systems. Although HIV causes
3.7 percent of mortality, it receives 25 percent of
international healthcare aid and a big chunk of
domestic expenditure ... Until we put HIV in its
place, countries will not get the delivery systems
they need [36].
England and others’ commentaries highlighted that
many diseases and health issues (such as malaria, under-
nutrition and respiratory disorders) resulted in more
deaths than those related to AIDS in many parts of the
world, but were receiving less funding. Whether or not
this neglect was because of the prioritization of the
AIDS response or due to other factors was hotly
contested.
UNAIDS and WHO responded defensively, noting
that those against AIDS exceptionalism attributed the
UN agencies more power than they had to address the
epidemic [37]. Research and policy looked to justify the
role of HIV/AIDS programmes within broader health
and development frameworks. Yu et al argued that
HIV/AIDS funding actually increased access to other
health resources in many underserved areas [38]. A
2007 report by the Institute of Medicine, charged with
monitoring PEPFAR, suggested that the vertical HIV/
AIDS programme could contribute to improving overall
health outcomes [39]. These debates have been engaged
with in more detail elsewhere [40]; here, they indicate
that the exceptionalism that was attributed to HIV/
AIDS as a global issue was called into question and,
occasionally, outright attacked.
The emergence of the most recent exceptionalism
debate is concurrent to a shift in donor country spend-
ing and priorities. Some donor countries have begun
redirecting HIV/AIDS funding; in 2009, the UK Depart-
ment for International Development reassigned a por-
tion of its AIDS funds to maternal and child mortality
programmes and health system strengthening [41].
Médecins Sans Frontières reports that The Netherlands
cut its HIV/AIDS spending by $70 million [27].
As these changes take place, proposals are emerging
to reorganize disease-specific funds in new ways. Sachs
and Pronyk argue that the Global Fund should increase
its mandate to include health systems, maternal and
child mortality and neglected tropical diseases [42].
Similarly, Ooms et al argue for transforming the Global
Fund from a disease-specific fund into a “Global Health
Fund” [43]. HIV/AIDS is being positioned as one of
many health issues requiring global resources. The cur-
rent and potential impacts for HIV/AIDS programmes
resulting from changes in funding patterns have been
well discussed [27]; here, they represent a current shift
away from prioritizing HIV/AIDS as a global issue.
The current AIDS epidemic and response
While the debate on the global exceptionality of AIDS
continues, HIV/AIDS will prevent many sub-Saharan
African countries from achieving the Millennium Devel-
opment Goals (MDGs) [44]. In high-prevalence coun-
tries (those with more than 10% of adults infected:
Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia,
South Africa, Swaziland, Swaziland, Zambia and Zim-
babwe), AIDS is the leading cause of death [27]. The
epidemic has been found to decrease gross domestic
product, create food security threats, and negatively
impact human resources. The consequent orphaning has
created new social costs for the state and for the house-
hold to bear; the number of orphans due to AIDS in
sub-Saharan Africa increased from 6.5 million in 2001
to 11.6 million in 2007 [45]. AIDS is the leading cause
of death for women worldwide [46], directly impacting
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MDG three (to promote gender equality and empower
women) and goal five (to improve maternal health). The
direct link between HIV/AIDS and development in
Africa remains.
The number of new HIV infections each year remains
unacceptably high, and models of effective prevention
programmes are few and far between. In the endemic
countries, mass behaviour-change campaigns, such as
the ABC (Abstain, Be Faithful and Use Condoms) strat-
egy, have failed to achieve their intended impacts. Advo-
cates are stressing the need to address the systemic
contributors to risk and vulnerability.
In South Africa, where one of the largest epidemics
continues to unfold, Venter writes that prevention
efforts are failing: “500 000 South Africans are infected
each year, and there is no sign that this is letting up. In
8 to 10 years’ time, as they enter the AIDS stage, these
500 000 South Africans will need ARVs, and this will
continue forever until a prevention strategy that works
is implemented” [47].
In Western countries, though the epidemic is concen-
trated in specific population groups, infection rates
among these groups are stable (but not declining). El-
Sadre et al write from the American perspective:
For the past decade, however, progress has been
stalled. It had been anticipated that effective antire-
troviral therapy, with its suppressive effect on viral
replication, would reduce the overall rate of new
infections, but this expectation has not been realized.
More than half a million Americans became infected
with HIV in the past decade, including about 56,000
in the past year [10].
The authors advocate for interventions that “address
the socioeconomic milieu in which HIV transmission
occurs” [10]. The social-political and human rights
approaches that originally motivated for an exceptional
response remain relevant to prevention, but are over-
shadowed by technical solutions, such as testing and
treatment.
Meanwhile, more than half of those in need still do
not have access to treatment, and treatment is posing
new challenges for sustainable funding. Most countries
with mid to high prevalence cannot afford the cost of
treatment without international aid; as aid is reduced or
cancelled, treatment programmes are threatened, drug
resistance develops and large numbers of PLHIV die. In
countries like Uganda, patients are being turned away
from treatment clinics due to lack of resources; 300,000
Ugandans in need of treatment are denied their right to
health [48]. These numbers will continue to grow if
both effective prevention and sustainably funded treat-
ment programmes are not forthcoming.
The gap between resources required to implement
HIV/AIDS programmes and those available has contin-
ued to grow over the past three years [49]. In 2009,
UNAIDS and WHO predicted that the $25.1 million
needed for HIV/AIDS programmes in 2010 would not
be forthcoming [49]. The total amount of Global Fund
grants recommended for funding in 2009 was 35% lower
than in 2008 [27]. In 2010, US President Barrack Obama
increased funding to PEPFAR only minimally, allocating
less to the Global Fund than in previous years, and
causing HIV/AIDS groups to express concern that the
amount allocated would not be enough to reach the tar-
geted number of PLHIV in need of treatment [50].
De Waal writes, “Normalization in the sense of adjust-
ing reality to take account of the miseries of AIDS can
be found in many places, when it is looked for. Even the
statistics become numbing, and when lower-than-
expected HIV prevalence is reported, as recently in
Kenya and Zimbabwe, it can give the impression that
things are ‘not so bad’ - when 7 to 10 percent of an
adult population is living with HIV” [3]. While it may
be that international opinion has become numbed by
the persistence of the AIDS epidemic, it remains, to
varying degrees in different regions, a prevalent and last-
ing feature of the global health landscape.
Conclusions
The concept of AIDS exceptionalism developed as a
Western response to an epidemic that threatened the
lives and rights of specific populations in the developed
world. As that epidemic was contained and effective
treatment became available, the case for exceptionalism
shifted to the international stage, where resources and
organizations were mobilized to respond to the extreme
need in developing countries. As a result, the numbers
of PLHIV on treatment has increased each year. Infec-
tion rates in much of the world have stabilized.
These gains have been accompanied by criticisms of
the type and size of response. It is argued that the HIV/
AIDS response has done harm, as well as good, particu-
larly by creating vertical programmes for a single dis-
ease, which may have diverted resources. As donor
countries shift priorities, and in the context of the eco-
nomic recession, the urgency around the HIV/AIDS
response is once again declining.
This shift in policy and international priorities does
not change the reality of an epidemic that, after three
decades, is still unfolding. In southern Africa, the demo-
graphic effects of the generalized epidemic will shape
societies for generations. In other parts of the world,
HIV/AIDS continues to mark inequalities: one in 40
blacks, one in 10 men who have sex with men, and one
in eight injection drug users in New York City are HIV
positive [10].
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Both the human rights approach, originally adopted by
the HIV/AIDS response, and the more recent demands
for universal access to treatment, remain relevant to the
33 million people living with HIV/AIDS and to their
communities; these issues should also remain pertinent
within global health policy. Meanwhile new challenges
are developing, not the least of which is the need to suc-
cessfully integrate the HIV/AIDS response within
broader public health responses to the benefit of all. As
Sachs notes in a commentary in The Lancet, “We are
not overspending on AIDS but underspending on the
rest ... The choice is not between AIDS, health systems,
and other Millennium Development Goals. We can and
must support them all” [42].
As how to best approach such challenges is debated,
we must not lose sight of the approximate 2 million
AIDS-related deaths that occur each year. Defining
these deaths as either exceptional or unexceptional
seems both callous and arbitrary.
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